Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Eyster, Erik
Rabin, Matthew
Weizsäcker, Georg
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 73
We investigate experimentally whether social learners appreciate the redundancy of information conveyed by their observed predecessors\' actions. Each participant observes a private signal and enters an estimate of the sum of all earlier-moving participants\' signals plus her own. In a first treatment, participants move single-file and observe all predecessors\' entries; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) predicts that each participant simply add her signal to her immediate predecessor\'s entry. Although 75% of participants do so, redundancy neglect by the other 25% generates excess imitation and mild inefficiencies. In a second treatment, participants move four per period; BNE predicts that most players anti-imitate some observed entries. Such anti-imitation occurs in 35% of the most transparent cases, and 16% overall. The remaining redundancy neglect creates dramatic excess imitation and inefficiencies: late-period entries are far too extreme, and on average participants would earn substantially more by ignoring their predecessors altogether.
social learning
redundancy neglect
higher-order beliefs
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
2.55 MB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.