Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185738
Authors: 
Dimakopoulos, Philipp D.
Heller, C.-Philipp
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 68
Abstract: 
We study the allocation of German lawyers to regional courts for legal trainee-ships. Because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before being allocated. The currently used \"Berlin\" mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements. We introduce a mechanism based on the matching with contracts literature, using waiting time as the contractual term. The resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, weakly Pareto efficient, eliminates justified envy and respects improvements. We extend our proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time.
Subjects: 
many-to-one matching
matching with contracts
stability
slot-specific choice functions
waiting time
legal education
JEL: 
D47
D82
C78
H75
I28
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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