Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185737 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 67
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze platform competition where user data is collected to improve adtargeting. Considering that users incur privacy costs, we show that the equilibrium level of data provision is distorted and can be inefficiently high or low: if overall competition is weak or if targeting benefits are low, too much private data is collected, and vice-versa. Further, we find that softer competition on either market side leads to more data collection, which implies substitutability between competition policy measures on both market sides. Moreover, if platforms engage in two-sided pricing, data provision is efficient.
Schlagwörter: 
ad targeting
platform competition
privacy
user data
JEL: 
D43
L13
L40
L86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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