Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185730
Authors: 
Angelova, Vera
Giebe, Thomas
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 60
Abstract: 
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents\' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance.
Subjects: 
contest
tournament
real-effort
experiment
contract theory
forward-looking
JEL: 
C91
D91
J22
J33
L02
M05
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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