Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185719 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 49
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers. We analyze the optimal timing of such choice-enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them. In our model, a firm provides a contract with automatic renewal. We show that a policy intending to enhance consumers choices when they choose a contract can be detrimental to welfare. By contrast, a choice-enhancing policy at the time of contract renewal increases welfare more robustly. Our results highlight that policies should be targeted in timing to the actual choice inefficiency.
Schlagwörter: 
active choice
automatic renewal
automatic enrollment
procrastination
consumer naivete
present bias
JEL: 
D03
D18
D21
D40
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
391.4 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.