Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185698 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 28
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that the excessive use of hidden orders causes artificial price pressures and abnormal asset returns. Using a simple game-theoretical setting, we demonstrate that this effect naturally arises from mis-coordination in trading schedules between traders, when suppliers of liquidity do not sufficiently disclose their trade intentions. As a result, hidden liquidity can increase trading costs and induce excess price fluctuations unrelated to information. Using NASDAQ order book data, we find strong empirical support and illustrate that hidden liquidity is higher if bid-ask spreads are smaller and relative tick sizes are higher.
Schlagwörter: 
Hidden liquidity
trade synchronization
trading frictions
counterparty attraction
limit order book
JEL: 
G02
G10
G23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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