Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185602
Authors: 
Ansink, Erik
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2018-083/VIII
Abstract: 
We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment in order to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players.
Subjects: 
Cartel games
Coalition formation
Common Pool Resources
Support
JEL: 
C72
D02
Q20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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