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Autoren: 
Homburg, Stefan
Datum: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7343
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows that the eurozone payment system does not effectively protect member states from speculative attacks. Suspicion of a departure from the common currency induces a terminal outflow of central bank money in weaker member states. TARGET2 cannot inhibit this drain but only protects central bank assets. Evidence presented here suggests that a run on Italy is already on the way. The paper also considers departure strategies of strong and weak member states and the distributive effects of an orderly eurozone dissolution.
Schlagwörter: 
currency speculation
TARGET2
eurozone
Italexit
dexit
trilemma
JEL: 
E52
E58
F45
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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