Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185515
Authors: 
Thuemmel, Uwe
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7317
Abstract: 
I study the optimal taxation of robots and labor income. In the model, robots substitute for routine labor and complement non-routine labor. I show that while it is optimal to distort robot adoption, robots may be either taxed or subsidized. The robot tax exploits general-equilibrium effects to compress the wage distribution. Wage compression reduces income-tax distortions of labor supply, thereby raising welfare. In the calibrated model, the optimal robot tax for the US is positive and generates small welfare gains. As the price of robots falls, inequality rises but the robot tax and its welfare impact become negligible.
Subjects: 
optimal taxation
input taxation
production efficiency
technological change
robots
inequality
general equilibrium
multidimensional heterogeneity
JEL: 
D31
D33
D50
H21
H23
H24
H25
J24
J31
O33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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