Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185514 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7316
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Adding a new dimension to determinants of corruption, this paper examines the effectiveness of enforcement in reducing corruption. We compare the influences of latent enforcement (police, judicial, and prosecutorial employment) versus actual enforcement (conviction rates) and enforcing institutions. Results based on data for more than 80 countries show that piecemeal enforcement to combat corruption by increasing enforcement employment is ineffective, rather comprehensive improvements in institutions by strengthening the rule of law or regulatory quality bear greater results. Thus, when it comes to corruption control, strong gums (institutions) are more effective than showing teeth (enforcement employment) or the bite (conviction rates).
Schlagwörter: 
corruption
enforcement
conviction rate
police
judges
prosecutors
institutions
regulatory quality
rule of law
JEL: 
K42
F50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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