Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185514
Authors: 
Capasso, Salvatore
Goel, Rajeev K.
Saunoris, James W.
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7316
Abstract: 
Adding a new dimension to determinants of corruption, this paper examines the effectiveness of enforcement in reducing corruption. We compare the influences of latent enforcement (police, judicial, and prosecutorial employment) versus actual enforcement (conviction rates) and enforcing institutions. Results based on data for more than 80 countries show that piecemeal enforcement to combat corruption by increasing enforcement employment is ineffective, rather comprehensive improvements in institutions by strengthening the rule of law or regulatory quality bear greater results. Thus, when it comes to corruption control, strong gums (institutions) are more effective than showing teeth (enforcement employment) or the bite (conviction rates).
Subjects: 
corruption
enforcement
conviction rate
police
judges
prosecutors
institutions
regulatory quality
rule of law
JEL: 
K42
F50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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