Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185359 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7161
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Sovereign defaults are bad news for investors and debtor countries, in particular if a default becomes messy and protracted. Why are some debt crises resolved quickly, in a matter of months, while others take many years to settle? This paper studies the duration of sovereign debt crises based on a new dataset and case study archive on debt renegotiations between governments and foreign banks and bondholders. Using Cox proportional hazard models, I find that domestic political instability (‘political risk’) is a significant predictor of negotiation delays, after controlling for macroeconomic conditions. Government crises, resignations, and street protests are particularly disruptive for a quick settlement process. Overall, the evidence suggests that debtor countries often lack the political ability to resolve a debt crisis. Governments in turmoil are unlikely to exit a default quickly.
Subjects: 
sovereign default
crisis resolution
political economy
JEL: 
F34
F51
H63
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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