Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185249 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11789
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Milton Friedman has famously claimed that the responsibility of a manager who is not the owner of a firm is "to conduct the business in accordance with their [the shareholders'] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible." In this paper we argue that when contracts are incomplete it is not necessarily in the interest even of money maximizing shareholders to pick a manager who pursues this goal. We show in a formal model and in a series of lab experiments that choosing a manager who has a preference to spend resources for social causes can increase employee motivation. In turn, ex-post losses in shareholder value may be offset by ex-ante gains in performance through higher employee motivation.
Schlagwörter: 
shareholder value
corporate social responsibility
incentives
motivation
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
D21
J33
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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