Andersen, Jørgen Juel Nordvik, Frode Martin Tesei, Andrea
Year of Publication:
Working Paper 810
We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls increase the probability of conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they decrease this probability in offshore-rich countries. We use a simple model of conflict to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to increase its fighting capacity, while onshore oil may be looted by oppositional groups to finance a rebellion. We provide empirical evidence supporting this interpretation: we find that oil windfalls i ncrease both the number and strength of active rebel groups in onshore-rich countries, while they strengthen the government in offshore-rich ones.