Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/184723
Authors: 
Mariotti, Thomas
Schweizer, Nikolaus
Szech, Nora
von Wangenheim, Jonas
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics 119
Abstract: 
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.
Subjects: 
Information Design
Information Nudges
Present-Biased Preferences
Self-Control
JEL: 
C73
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.