Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/184707 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 107
Verlag: 
Osnabrück University, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrück
Zusammenfassung: 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism was introduced to eliminate the common-pool problem and limit uncontrolled lending by national central banks (NCBs). We analyze its effectiveness. Second, we model how, by forbearing and providing refinancing credit, NCBs avoid domestic resolution costs and, instead, share potential losses within the Euro Area. This results in "evergreening" of bad loans. Third, we construct a new evergreening index based on a large worldwide survey administered by the ifo institute. Regressions show evergreening is significantly greater in the Euro Area and where banks are in distress. Finally, greater evergreening accompanies higher growth of NCB-credit and Target2-liabilities.
Schlagwörter: 
Single Supervisory Mechanism
Evergreening
Non-performing Loans
Common-pool Problem
JEL: 
F33
F55
E58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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