Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/184667 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Publisher: 
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for (un)employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.
Subjects: 
indivisible labor
lotteries
unobservable effort
insurance
no-shirking efficiency wages
JEL: 
E1
J22
J41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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