Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/184653 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 11/2018
Verlag: 
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier
Zusammenfassung: 
In the theory of public enforcement of law the choice of the liability rules is between strict liability and fault-based liability. In this paper, we study the determinants of compliance when in addition to standard economic incentives wrongdoers take into account stigmatization costs. In this context, this cost is not simply a transfer of resources. We show that a non-guiltiness standard - the fault standard equal to the deterrence level - is never optimal. In this scenario, we show how the optimal policy choice depends on the interplay between the magnitude of the harm and the stigmatization cost.
Schlagwörter: 
Stigmatization
Regulatory Offenses
Law Enforcement
Strict Liability
Negligence
Legal Standard
Compliance
Deterrence
JEL: 
K13
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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