Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18461 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 568
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a model with two firms operating their individual networks. Each firm can choose its price as well as its investment to build up its network. Assuming a skewed distribution of consumers, our model leads to an asymmetric market structure with one firm choosing higher investments. While access regulation imposed on the dominant firm leads to lower prices, positive welfare effects are diminished by strategic investment decisions of the firms. Within a dynamic game with indirect network effects leading to potentially increased demand, regulation can substantially lower aggregate social welfare. Conditional access holidays can alleviate regulatory failure.
Schlagwörter: 
Regulation
network effects
natural monopoly
JEL: 
L51
D43
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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