Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18458
Authors: 
Borck, Rainald
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 565
Abstract: 
This paper models voters' preferences over central versus local education policies when there are private alternatives. Education is financed by income taxes and individuals are mobile between communities. Public education levels are chosen by majority vote. Contrary to conventional wisdom, centralisation may benefit the rich and poor, while the middle class prefer decentralised education. The model is also extended to include peer effects. Peer effects increase the support for central school finance, even in the community with good public schools.
Subjects: 
education
centralisation
private schools
majority voting
JEL: 
I22
D72
H72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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