Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/184411 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Comparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe [ISSN:] 2082-6737 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] De Gruyter [Place:] Warsaw [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 141-159
Verlag: 
De Gruyter, Warsaw
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a model for audit market interventions. The study asks whether interventions in the audit market result in excessive premiums at the cost of quality and independence. The model was tested based on a historical data sample of 1,927 companies' fiscal year financial statements, observed for the period 2010-2013. The testing strategy combined statistical analysis of the market concentration and regression of abnormal results. The findings do not support, for the Polish market, the conclusion that the audit market is used as a leverage for consulting services. This paper discusses possibilities of systematic risk for policymakers as a result of the negative interaction between regulated and non-regulated markets.
Schlagwörter: 
agent
audit
conflict
non-audit
quality
model
earnings management
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