Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18409 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 677
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines how politicians influenced social security policy in Germany. Using yearly data from the German Pension Insurance from 1957 to 2005, revenues as well as expenditures are analysed in linear regression models, respectively. In accordance with opportunistic political behaviour, revenues from contributions decreased in pre-election years. Most important, pension expenditures increased in election years. Interestingly, the CDU/FDP governments provided higher subsidies to the social security system than the grand coalition and the SPD/GR government. Overall, there is no evidence for the prospect, that left coalitions caused higher intergenerational redistribution than right governments.
Schlagwörter: 
social security
partisan politics
pension system
JEL: 
H55
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
303.5 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.