Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18409
Authors: 
Potrafke, Niklas
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 677
Abstract: 
This paper examines how politicians influenced social security policy in Germany. Using yearly data from the German Pension Insurance from 1957 to 2005, revenues as well as expenditures are analysed in linear regression models, respectively. In accordance with opportunistic political behaviour, revenues from contributions decreased in pre-election years. Most important, pension expenditures increased in election years. Interestingly, the CDU/FDP governments provided higher subsidies to the social security system than the grand coalition and the SPD/GR government. Overall, there is no evidence for the prospect, that left coalitions caused higher intergenerational redistribution than right governments.
Subjects: 
social security
partisan politics
pension system
JEL: 
H55
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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