Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/183612 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper Series No. 602
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently poor relative performance suffer demotion coupled with a significant loss in imputed compensation. Scarring effects are absent when liquidations are preceded by normal relative performance or involve mid-level employees. Seen through the lens of a model with moral hazard and adverse selection, these results can be ascribed to reputation loss rather than bad luck. The findings suggest that performance-induced liquidations supplement compensation-based incentives.
Schlagwörter: 
careers
hedge funds
asset managers
market discipline
scarring effects
JEL: 
G20
G23
J24
J62
J63
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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