Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/183567 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 18-045
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes. In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the former is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the latter is carried out by private insurance companies whose money is at stake through the so-called performance bonding. By focusing on the U.S. federal service contracts in the period 2005-2015, we exploit an exogenous variation in the threshold for the application of both sources of oversight in order to separately estimate their causal e effects on execution costs and time. We find that: (i) private oversight has a positive effect on outcomes through the screening of bidders that alters the pool of winning firms; (ii) public oversight negatively affects outcomes, due to excessive red tape induced by low-competence buyers.
Schlagwörter: 
oversight
procurement
screening
red tape
moral hazard
JEL: 
D21
D44
D82
H57
L74
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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