Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18354
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:41:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:41:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18354-
dc.description.abstracthis paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under diŽerent assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x503en_US
dc.subject.jelO15en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsmodellen_US
dc.titleVoting, Inequality, and Redistributionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn494463228en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp503en_US

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