Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18354
Authors: 
Borck, Rainald
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 503
Abstract: 
his paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under diŽerent assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.
Subjects: 
inequality
redistribution
voting
JEL: 
O15
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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