Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351
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dc.contributor.authorBaake, Pioen_US
dc.contributor.authorMitusch, Kayen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:41:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:41:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351-
dc.description.abstractWe model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x500en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.jelL96en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtelecommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmobile phonesen_US
dc.subject.keywordmobile-to-mobile access chargesen_US
dc.subject.keywordnetwork effectsen_US
dc.titleMobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn494462701en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp500en_US

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