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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Baake, Pio | en |
dc.contributor.author | Mitusch, Kay | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:41:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:41:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDIW Discussion Papers |x500 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L96 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | telecommunication | en |
dc.subject.keyword | mobile phones | en |
dc.subject.keyword | mobile-to-mobile access charges | en |
dc.subject.keyword | network effects | en |
dc.title | Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 494462701 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp500 | en |
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