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Autor:innen: 
Baake, Pio
Mitusch, Kay
Datum: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 500
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
telecommunication
mobile phones
mobile-to-mobile access charges
network effects
JEL: 
L41
L96
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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