Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/183507
Authors: 
Tebbe, Eva
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Empirical Industrial Organization II C12-V2
Abstract: 
This article presents results of a laboratory experiment testing whether the effectiveness of a moderate leniency program depends on market size. Against theory, the results indicate that a moderate leniency program is not preferable to a policy which only includes fines for detected cartels, either in duopolies or in quadropolies. Surprisingly, the leniency program is not even entirely to be preferred compared to a laissez-faire policy. Yet, the leniency program seems to work better in markets involving four firms, compared to markets with two firms, especially in terms of the prevention of hysteresis effects.
Subjects: 
Cartels
Corporate Leniency Program
Experiments
Hysteresis effect
Chat-hysteresis
Bertrand game
JEL: 
C9
D3
D4
L1
L4
Document Type: 
Conference Paper
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