Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/183422 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1193
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We construct a model of strategic behavior in sequential markets which exhibits a persistent forward price premium. On the spot market, producers wield market power while purchasers are price takers. Producers with forward commitments have less incentive to raise prices on the spot market. Purchasers are thus willing to pay a premium to producers for forward contracts. We argue that this type of forward premium is not susceptible to arbitrage by speculators on the forward market, since purchasers prefer forward contracts backed by producers.
Schlagwörter: 
Forward pricing
Electricity markets
Market power
Arbitrage
JEL: 
D43
G13
L12
L13
Q41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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