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Autoren: 
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan
Persson, Lars
Svensson, Roger
Datum: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1186
Zusammenfassung: 
When and how do entrepreneurs sell their inventions? To address this issue, we develop an endogenous entry-sale asymmetric information oligopoly model. We show that lowquality inventions are sold directly or used for own entry. Inventors who sell post-entry use entry to credibly reveal information on quality. Incumbents are then willing to pay high prices for high-quality inventions to preempt rivals from obtaining them. Using Swedish data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under preemptive bidding competition, post entry.
Schlagwörter: 
Acquisitions
Innovation
Start-ups
Ownership
Patents
Verification
Quality
JEL: 
G24
L1
L2
M13
O3
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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