Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18289 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorMeran, Georgen
dc.contributor.authorvon Hirschhausen, Christian R.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:40:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:40:36Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18289-
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are excluded from the agreement. The results are then compared with the outcome of traditional ex-ante regulation. We find that while industrial self-regulation leads to an exploitation of households, the effect on the foreign producers is unclear.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x436en
dc.subject.jelL95en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleCorporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn394290127en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp436en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
242.13 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.