Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18289
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMeran, Georgen_US
dc.contributor.authorvon Hirschhausen, Christian R.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:40:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:40:36Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18289-
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are excluded from the agreement. The results are then compared with the outcome of traditional ex-ante regulation. We find that while industrial self-regulation leads to an exploitation of households, the effect on the foreign producers is unclear.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x436en_US
dc.subject.jelL95en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleCorporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sectoren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn394290127en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp436en_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
242.13 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.