Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18289
Authors: 
Meran, Georg
von Hirschhausen, Christian R.
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 436
Abstract: 
This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access price, whereas the competitive fringe of foreign gas producers (third party) and the household customers are excluded from the agreement. The results are then compared with the outcome of traditional ex-ante regulation. We find that while industrial self-regulation leads to an exploitation of households, the effect on the foreign producers is unclear.
JEL: 
L95
D43
L13
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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