Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/182580
Authors: 
Hunold, Matthias
Hüschelrath, Kai
Laitenberger, Ulrich
Muthers, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 302
Abstract: 
This article studies competition in markets with transport costs and capacity constraints. We compare the outcomes of price competition and coordination in a theoretical model and find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers who are closer to the competitor's plant. If firms compete, the transport distance also varies in the degree of overcapacity, but not if they coordinate their sales. Using a rich micro-level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we study a cartel breakdown to identify the effect of competition on transport distances. Our econometric analyses support the theoretical predictions.
Subjects: 
capacity constraints
cartel
cement
spatial competition
transport costs
JEL: 
K21
L11
L41
L61
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-301-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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