Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/182080 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [ISSN:] 1864-6042 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2018-57 [Publisher:] Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-21
Publisher: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Abstract: 
In this article the author considers an economy in which individuals are matched into pairs and the desirability of an individual depends on her position on the distribution of wealth. He assumes that individuals show their relative standing by consuming a conspicuous good and he shows that there exist different social norms supporting different matching arrangements. In addition, individuals have to vote over a redistributive policy and the author shows that, despite the desirability of the full redistributive outcomes, under some economic conditions the medium class is able to match with the high class in exchange of a minimum level of redistribution of wealth which keeps the low class far from economic and social opportunities.
Subjects: 
social status
conspicuous consumption
matching
redistribution of wealth
income inequality
social organizations
JEL: 
D11
D31
D62
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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