Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/182077 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 2111
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
Sovereign defaults are bad news for investors and debtor countries, in particular if a default becomes messy and protracted. Why are some debt crises resolved quickly, in a matter of months, while others take many years to settle? This paper studies the duration of sovereign debt crises based on a new dataset and case study archive on debt renegotiations between governments and foreign banks and bondholders. Using Cox proportional hazard models, I find that domestic political instability ('political risk') is a significant predictor of negotiation delays, after controlling for macroeconomic conditions. Government crises, resignations, and street protests are particularly disruptive for a quick settlement process. Overall, the evidence suggests that debtor countries often lack the political ability to resolve a debt crisis. Governments in turmoil are unlikely to exit a default quickly.
Schlagwörter: 
Sovereign Default
Crisis Resolution
Political Economy
JEL: 
F34
F51
H63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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