Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/182000 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 300
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate whether online travel agents (OTAs) assign hotels worse positions in their search results if these set lower hotel prices at other OTAs or on their own websites. We formally characterize how an OTA can use such a strategy to reduce price differentiation across distribution channels. Our empirical analysis shows that the position of a hotel in the search results of OTAs is better when the prices charged by the hotel on other channels are higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis that OTAs alter their search results to discipline hotels for aggressive prices on competing channels, and by this reduce search quality for consumers.
Schlagwörter: 
consumer protection
free-riding
hotel booking
online travel agents
ranking
search bias
JEL: 
D40
L42
L81
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-299-8
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
834.33 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.