Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18168 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 432
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other?s markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened.
Schlagwörter: 
Collusive behavior
trade liberalisation
specific tariffs
market access cost
JEL: 
F15
F12
L12
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
219.72 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.