Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18168
Authors: 
Schröder, Philipp J. H.
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers 432
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other?s markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened.
Subjects: 
Collusive behavior
trade liberalisation
specific tariffs
market access cost
JEL: 
F15
F12
L12
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
219.72 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.