Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181635
Authors: 
Pitsoulis, Athanassios
Schwuchow, Soeren
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: International Cooperation G13-V1
Abstract: 
On June 19, 2017 the European Union and the British government officially commenced negotiations on the terms of the British exit from the union. The dominant view among most economic policy analysts and commentators seems to be that the cards are clearly stacked against Britain and that the high-handed behaviour of the British representatives is, at best, either a bluff or, at worst, a sign of a loss of reality. In this paper we develop a formal model to show how this uncertainty regarding the preferences and strategy of the British side may affect the dynamic of the negotiations and may lead to unanticipated outcomes.
Subjects: 
Brexit
game theory
madman strategy
trembling-hand perfection
JEL: 
D78
E65
H12
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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