Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181581
Authors: 
Gebauer, Stefan
Mazelis, Falk
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Macrofinance I E11-V2
Abstract: 
Macroprudential policies for financial institutions have received increasing prominence since the global financial crisis. These policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. For this purpose, we develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistically competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999 – 2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. In a counterfactual analysis we compare how a macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis on all financial institutions, or just on commercial banks, would have dampened the leverage cycle.
Subjects: 
Macroprudential Regulation
Shadow Banking
Financial Frictions
JEL: 
E12
E61
F45
G23
G28
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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