Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181574
Authors: 
Baskaran, Thushyanthan
Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Institutions A17-V2
Abstract: 
We study the local favoritism of appointed German state ministers. Matching hand-collected data on ministers’ place of residence to a sample of more than 8,000 west German municipalities during the period 1994–2013, we find that the home municipality of a state minister experiences higher employment growth than control municipalities. Given the institutional context, this effect is ostensibly due to apolitical favoritism (home bias) rather than electoral considerations. We conclude that favoritism may lead to a distortion in the allocation of public resources even in contexts with strong political institutions.
Subjects: 
Distributive politics
Favoritism
Employment growth
JEL: 
D73
H70
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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