Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Stadler, Manfred
Neus, Werner
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Organizations and Firms F09-V3
We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds while the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a cross-holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This type of coordination leads to compensation contracts which make the managers less aggressive such that the firms involved in the coordination reduce their output while the outside firm increases its output. The reallocation of production induces a redistribution of profits: the outside firm and the most efficient firm owned by the index funds gain from the coordination while the less efficient firm owned by the index funds might suffer from a loss of profit if cost differences are large. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare.
Index funds
cross holdings
shareholder coordination
strategic manager compensation
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.