Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181525
Authors: 
Schlag, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Theory - Concepts G04-V3
Abstract: 
We propose a new concept for how to make choices in games without assuming an equilibrium. To beat the average means to obtain a higher payoff against the others than the others obtain amongst themselves, for any way in which the game might be played. Only Nash equilibrium strategies can beat the average. Beating the average is possible in many symmetric games, including Cournot competition with convex demand. In many other games, including Betrand competition, there are strategies that “almost” beat the average. The methodology is easy to implement and extremely versatile, for instance it can incorporate incomplete information.
Document Type: 
Conference Paper
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