Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/181506 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Poster Session Experiments No. P02-V3
Verlag: 
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract information from hypothetical events - like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction perform better when the requirements for this cognitive issue – also denoted by contingent reasoning - are relaxed, leaving all other parameters unchanged. The overall pattern of the data suggests that the problem of irrational over- and underbidding can be weakened by giving the subjects ex ante feedback about their bid, but unlike related studies I also find negative effects of additional information.
Schlagwörter: 
Hypothetical thinking
cursed equilibrium
winner's curse
JEL: 
D03
D44
D82
D83
C91
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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