Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181506
Authors: 
Moser, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Poster Session Experiments P02-V3
Abstract: 
There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract information from hypothetical events - like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction perform better when the requirements for this cognitive issue – also denoted by contingent reasoning - are relaxed, leaving all other parameters unchanged. The overall pattern of the data suggests that the problem of irrational over- and underbidding can be weakened by giving the subjects ex ante feedback about their bid, but unlike related studies I also find negative effects of additional information.
Subjects: 
Hypothetical thinking
cursed equilibrium
winner's curse
JEL: 
D03
D44
D82
D83
C91
Document Type: 
Conference Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.