Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181214
Authors: 
Mense, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 10/2018
Abstract: 
I study the information value of energy efficiency certificates. By using data on repeatedly observed buildings, I separate the rent premium for certified energy efficiency from the premium for readily observable energy efficiency. The buildings were observed before, in-between and after two consecutive law changes that first made certification compulsory and then introduced fines for non-compliers. The strategy allows to control for time-fixed effects of the buildings and for changes in energy efficiency premia over time. I find a precisely measured, but economically and statistically insignificant effect of certification. Supplementary analysis suggests that consumers do value energy efficiency per se, and that energy cost savings translate into higher rents 1-by-1. Further, in a simple theoretical framework, I study the channels through which certification of buildings affects energy consumption. One implication from theory is that compulsory certification is unlikely to be welfare-increasing, even if certificates carry additional information. Given the empirical results of this paper, it is almost certainly welfare-decreasing.
Subjects: 
certification
energy efficiency
information asymmetry
value of information
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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