Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180848
Authors: 
Mehta, Nirav
Year of Publication: 
2018
Abstract: 
This paper examines the potential output gains from the implementation of optimal teacher incentive pay schemes, by calibrating the H¨olmstrom and Milgrom (1987) hidden action model using data from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), a teacher incentive pay experiment implemented in Andhra Pradesh, India. Findings suggest that the introduction of optimal individual incentive-pay schemes could result in very large increases in output, about six times the size of the (significant) results obtained in the experiment.
Subjects: 
empirical contracts
teacher incentive schemes
JEL: 
I2
J3
J4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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